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If you’re like me, you may dread long 
plane trips, not out of anxiety about flying, 
but rather out of fear of being stuck next 
to a loquacious but studiously uninformed 
traveler. But if your seatmate happens to 
be Rosa Brooks, you know you’re going to 
have an interesting and thoughtful ride. If 
you aren’t sure that’s going to happen 
anytime soon, however, consider bringing 
along her new book, How Everything 
Became War and the Military Became 
Everything: Tales from the Pentagon.  
(Full disclosure, my friend Rosa—I’ll refer 
to her in this review as Rosa, rather than 
Professor Brooks—very kindly listed me in 
her book’s acknowledgements.) 
 
Though subtitled “Tales from the 
Pentagon,” this book is not some sort of 
mindless “tell-all” by a former government 
official. Instead it’s a thoughtful analysis 
of national security in a capacious sense, 
as seen by a former journalist turned 
Georgetown law professor turned 
Pentagon official turned defense thinker. 
How Everything Became War is one of 
those rare books in which there is no part 
not worth reading; moreover, it addresses 
an astonishing number of issues for a 
volume of this length. You’ll learn about 
such diverse security issues as piracy, 
military detention, our strategic deafness 
about Africa, stability operations, drones, 
covert operations, cyber, nonlethal 
weapons, the militarization of foreign 
policy, and much more.   
 
The wide range of topics in How 
Everything Became War is perhaps less for 
its own sake than to point to the 
interconnections between them, and also 
to show the structure of national security 
decision-making on a day-to-day basis and 
the many offices of government and 
officials — far beyond simply the 
Department of Defense and a handful of 
intelligence agencies — involved in 
making them. These are weighty topics, 
but the book proceeds in a deceptively 
easy narrative tone, revealing Rosa’s 
skill’s as a journalist. It opens, for 
example, with an account of sitting in an 
“anonymous Pentagon conference room … 
listening as briefers from the military’s 
Special Operations command went over 
plans for an impending strike against a 
terrorist operative.” 
 
I say “deceptively easy” narrative, because 
although How Everything Became War 
often uses Rosa’s own experiences working 
in the Pentagon for a little over two years 
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— not, interestingly, as a practicing 
lawyer, but instead as a senior advisor to 
Under Secretary of Defense Michele 
Flournoy — its point is not memoir as 
such. Rather, Rosa uses her experiences, 
set against her own self-described 
background as the product of a family of 
“left-wing antiwar activists” with many 
prior assumptions about the US military, 
to probe into the interior functioning of 
the American national security apparatus 
and American military culture. 
 
As she says, the two years she spent in the 
Pentagon were “strange, almost surreal in 
their intensity” and she was simply too 
busy while in the job to be able to 
contemplate or analyze deeper questions 
about the structure of America’s national 
security institutions. That’s the point of 
this book — to undertake the serious 
analysis — and it might be thought of as 
an exercise in "deep" journalism or 
perhaps anthropology. Especially strong 
are Rosa’s observations as to how and why 
contemporary civil-military relations are 
marred by mistrust and 
misunderstandings at the senior levels of 
government, and how this plays out on a 
day-to-day basis.  
 
Her account of dealing with a civilian 
counterpart on the National Security 
Council, for example, who simply called up 
one day asking — telling — the Pentagon 
to shift a surveillance drone platform from 
whatever it was doing for Central 
Command, to monitor political events in 
Kyrgyzstan bears reading in full (pp. 307-
311). The NSC staffer evidently thought 
calling for shifting a surveillance drone 
and its support was something akin to 
ordering up a Big Mac; moreover, he 
seemed not to understand that neither he 
nor Rosa had the authority to order 
Central Command to do this. Her 
experience illustrates that there are 
civilian officials who should (and need to) 
know better — not only clueless as to how 
the military works but also having a 
skewed understanding of what “civil-
military relations” really is supposed to 
mean. And that’s just within the national 
security community of the executive 
branch; the gaps in understanding and 
trust are often even larger when extended 





Although much of How Everything Became 
War is about these “processes” internal to 
the US national security community — 
ways decisions are reached and policies 
and actions taken — it also has many 
interesting discussions about substantive 
policies themselves. The development of 
autonomous weapons is one, and it is 
another area where I find myself in 
violent agreement with the book. Arguing 
that autonomous weapons might “be more 
capable of behaving far more humanely 
than we might assume” (and possibly 
more humanely than humans in many 
situations), she demonstrates her 
readiness to risk her street cred with the 
human rights community with which she 
has long been associated, and particularly 
Human Rights Watch and associated 
advocacy organizations’ “killer robots” 
campaign calling for an outright ban on 
these weapons. 
 
This is not to say that everyone will agree 
with everything she has to say. I 
disagreed with her on more than a few of 
the issues. For example, she speaks 
regretfully (as do many others) of not 
being able to close Guantanamo.  
Although I think the President ought to 
have the authority to do so, I also believe 
the evidence is scant that its closure 
would markedly change anyone’s opinion 
of the U.S. or alter terrorist behavior one 
scintilla, and may even create a whole new 
set of issues. 
 
Apart from straight-up disagreement on 
several issues, in some cases I found 
myself disappointed with the one-
sidedness of her treatment of some topics. 
Her hostility to drone warfare is one 
example; it’s not that her arguments don’t 
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have merit, but rather it’s the failure to 
articulate the other side of the argument 
with the same rigor. In fairness to the 
book, however, it takes up so many topics 
that I finally came to realize that it was 
simply not possible for her to address 
every aspect (to include all opposing views 
and interpretations) of every issue. That 
said, the reader needs to understand that 
there are other perspectives and 
interpretations. 
 
How Everything Became War has one 
theme, indicated by the book’s title, of 
special importance in both civil-military 
affairs and regarding American society 
more broadly. This is her observation 
(often made but given an especially 
shrewd discussion in this book) that more 
and more matters are being given to the 
military to solve, even though it may not 
be the best entity to attempt to do so or an 
entity that even has the capability of 
doing so. This handover, or desire to hand 
tasks over, arises in no small part because 
military is seemingly the only institution 
of government left standing in the public 
mind with any serious credibility.  
 
Several other reviews of this book have 
appeared to take the view that this 
phenomenon is a product of 9/11 and the 
public embrace of the US military in the 
years following. It seems unlikely that it 
would have happened following 9/11 if 
that public credibility had not grown in 
earlier years. And in a 1991 seminal essay 
in The Atlantic (“Military Efficiency”) 
James Fallows mused on the many things 
the military seemed able to accomplish 
and said: “I’m beginning to think that the 
only way to get the national government 
to do anything worthwhile is to invent a 
security threat and turn the job over to 
the military.” This important aspect of 
American civil-military affairs has a long 
pedigree. Moreover, a journalist, justly 
lauding Rosa’s book, reminded me of a 
futuristic article I myself wrote in 1992 
that was deeply influenced by Fallow’s 
essay. In describing what I thought the 
world would be like twenty years hence 
(i.e., 2012), I said that the “one institution 
of government in which the people 
retained faith was the military.  Buoyed 
by the military’s obvious competence in 
the First Gulf War, the public increasingly 
turned to it for solutions to the country’s 
problems.”  
 
Fast forward from 1992 to 2016 and Rosa 
says Americans view the military “as the 
only reasonably well-functioning public 
institution we have these days [and,] as a 
result, Americans increasingly treat the 
military as an all-purpose tool for fixing 
anything that happens to be broken.” 
True, but it would be an interesting 
discussion to address that phenomenon 
more broadly, as it so clearly predates 
9/11. How Everything Became War also 
makes, however, a number of critiques of 
the U.S. military establishment. It offers a 
catalogue of prescriptions to radically 
change its organization; most of these are 
proposals familiar to Lawfare readers as 
they are frequent topics of discussion in 
Washington think tanks.   
 
While agreeing with much she has to say 
regarding reform, I still would counsel 
caution, given the current popularity just 
noted of the military among Americans 
(polls show the public has overwhelmingly 
more confidence in it that any other entity 
in our society), and the fact that virtually 
all analysts believe it to be the world’s 
strongest. It’s axiomatic that any change 
in the existing formula that has produced 
an institution so popular at home and so 
respected abroad needs powerful 
justification to overcome the maxim of “if 





Of course, even the best organizations 
need to evolve, but change can produce 
unintended, negative consequences. For 
example, Rosa criticizes the military’s 
fitness and age requirements as keeping 
people with high-tech skills out of the 
military. But in a nation of 310 million 
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people, enlisting a fit, young, and skilled 
cadre for the relatively small number of 
people (less than 1% of population) the 
military requires is hardly an 
impossibility. The strategic costs — both 
at home and abroad — of a force perceived 
as unfit, aged, and potentially out-of-touch 
could be very great. (Parenthetically, in 
today’s combat theaters, every soldier can 
find him or herself in a physically-
demanding situation, regardless of job 
title.) 
 
She also suggests that the military ought 
to send its “ten brightest young officers off 
to Silicon Valley for a few years.” 
Obviously, there could be benefits in 
learning the ways of the byte barons. But 
Silicon Valley is not only one of the 
poshest and wealthiest places on the 
planet, it’s also imbued with what one 
writer calls a culture of “self-importance 
and greed” — the very antipathy of the 
values the military wants to inculcate into 
its “brightest young officers.” On a more 
practical level, how confident are we that 
a soldier’s family (which so often dictates 
whether a soldier stays or leaves the 
military), having enjoyed the privileges 
and luxuries of Silicon Valley life, will be 
satisfied with the working-class environs 
and the torrid summers of, say, a dusty 
and remote (but inexplicably named) Ft. 
Bliss, TX? 
 
How Everything Became War further 
contends that, since relatively few 
positions in the military involve direct 
combat, they could be filled — à la World 
War II — with persons drawn from 
civilian life, costumed in a uniform, and 
awarded a rank that ordinarily requires 
years to earn. One of the examples she 
uses is that of a lawyer. Though this 
might smack of special pleading, I would 
suggest that the legal environment has 
changed markedly since World War II, 
and it takes a lot of time to fully 
understand the intricacies and difficulties 
of the “business” of this highly unusual 
and unique “client.” (Indeed, the most 
sophisticated civilian lawyers these days 
focus their practices narrowly, and take 
years to acquire their special expertise; 
few would say that an outsider could 
practice competently via occasional forays, 
even if endowed with a “partner” 
appellation.) 
 
Even more important are the intangibles 
that can only be acquired by being part of 
the armed forces themselves for an 
extended period. It is easy for civilians to 
think that military occupations are 
interchangeable with a seemingly similar 
job in civilian life. However, the eminent 
military historian John Keegan (who, 
though without military experience 
himself, taught for years at the British 
military academy Sandhurst) relates 
something worth pondering, based on his 
“life cast among warriors.”  Soldiers, he 
said, 
 
are not as other men … [that] lesson 
has taught me to view with extreme 
suspicion all theories and 
representations of war that equate it 
with any other activity in human 
affairs … Connection does not 
amount to identity or even to 
similarity …. War … must be fought 
by men whose values and skills 
[differ] … . They are those of a world 
apart, a very ancient world, which 
exists in parallel with the everyday 
world but does not belong to it. 
 
One may argue whether lawyers and the 
many others specialties Rosa believes are 
readily substitutable with civilians are 
“warriors,” but the real point is that in 
order to be truly effective at these 
putatively “civilian” endeavors within 
military culture, one must embrace a “life 
cast among warriors.” It really is that 
simple. Apart from everything else, it is a 
mistake for a civilian to think that a 
military member, especially at the senior 
levels, will usually — or, maybe, ever — 
trust them as much as a fellow career 
servicemember. The bond of shared 
experience is real, and means much in the 
military context. 




One of the great strengths of the book — 
and the underpinning of its theme — is 
her cogent tutorial on the evolution of 
efforts to use law to “tame” war. She 
includes in that account a discussion of 
the role of military lawyers (she calls 
them, affectionately — I think — “Boy 
Scouts”) since 9/11. What was especially 
revealing — intriguing — to me was the 
degree of hostility some Bush-era civilian 
lawyers evinced towards attorneys in 
uniform, mainly, it seems, because those 
military lawyers did not share the then-
Administration’s views on certain 
fundamental law of war and other issues. 
 
How Everything Became War's central 
premise here is that, historically, the 
human condition has typically been a 
binary state, that is, at either war or 
peace.  This circumstance, Rosa contends, 
is fundamentally different today because 
of the rise of potent non-state belligerents 
and technology-empowered terrorists. She 
makes the not-implausible argument that 
since today we live in a world that is not 
quite peace and not quite war, current law 
is inadequate, because it grounded in an 
unrealistic binary. She contends that 
today nations seek to implement 
mechanistically either the peacetime legal 
regime or the war convention, despite the 
fact that neither paradigm quite applies to 
contemporary reality. This leads her to 
advocate some sort of new, hybrid set of 
laws to address this blurriness.   
 
I suspect that military historians will take 
issue with her proposal, as there are 
plenty of examples of conflicts that 
involved irregular fighter, terrorists, and 
exploitative criminals. There has always 
been a mixture of threats and enemy 
capabilities. The history of armed 
engagements, small or large, involving 
U.S. military forces over the past, say, 100 
years shows, if anything, that small-scale 
engagements and uses of military force or 
its threat are long-running features of the 
American experience of “peacetime.” The 
Cold War was conducted with many hot 
encounters and conflicts, fought through 
proxy forces and using tools of covert 
action and deliberately blurred conditions 
of attribution, on both sides, in part 
because both sides wished to avoid a 
nuclear confrontation.  
 
The “peacetime” of the Cold War is 
perhaps the norm that the present most 
resembles, including not just 
transnational terrorists and non-state 
armies, but also the re-entry of Russia 
into the military history of the world — 
and not in a good way. Perhaps, too, the 
clean bright lines of the “binary” legal 
conception should be considered as a 
temporary construction made possible 
during the golden years following the end 
of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet 
Union, in which international great power 
struggles were muted under the umbrella 
of U.S. power.  If so, then some form of the 
“hybrid” legal regime that Rosa proposes 
is not so much as novelty as a reversion to 
the historical mean of just how messy 
ordinary “peace” can be. 
 
And in any case, the law of war is itself 
evolutionary.  The International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg concluded that the 
“law is not static, but by continual 
adaption follows the needs of a changing 
world.”  True today? Consider how quickly 
the international community has gone 
from eschewing attacks against economic 
targets to virtually carpet bombing 
Islamic State oil fields. Cyber? We now 
have the Tallinn Manual — which is a 
testament to the feasibility of applying 
existing law to new technology. (And 





How Everything Became War also seems 
to believe that the law of war paradigm 
has come at the cost of human rights.  
Putting aside what occurred in the 
aftermath of 9/11, the fact is that today 
military operations, at least as conducted 
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by the US and its allies, are far more 
constrained than the law of war would 
permit. Indeed, if there is a criticism to be 
leveled (and both Presidential candidates 
seem to have done so), it’s that the air war 
against the Islamic State has not been 
prosecuted to the fullest extent that the 
law would permit. The real human rights 
and moral issue today is not too-
aggressive military action on the part of 
the US and its allies, but rather policy-
driven inaction.  
 
In addition to the international legal 
scene, a major portion of the book is spent 
enumerating what Rosa sees as flaws in a 
domestic legal scheme that, in her opinion, 
yields too often to the perceived needs of 
security. Her criticisms generally (but not 
always) track those of privacy advocates, 
human rights organizations, and left-of-
center progressives. Her perspective in 
this area is unapologetically one of an 
advocate, not a dispassionate elucidator of 
opposing sides. That understood, is she 
right that we need real change in both 
international and domestic law? 
 
A guarded “maybe” is all I can muster. 
Caution is (again) merited, as 
international law regulating conflict is 
already under stress. Moreover, almost 
every initiative for change — largely 
coming from the human rights community 
— is aimed at further endowing non-state 
actors with additional legal rights and 
privileges (despite their utter contempt for 
the law), rather than enhancing the 
ability of states to protect their citizenry, 
as that citizenry seems to want. We need 
to be very careful not to reinforce the 
notion that the law is drifting into 
seeming impotence and irrelevance — not 
just from newly empowered non-state 
actors, but also from rising or re-emerging 
Great Powers as, for example, Russia 
conducts an air war in Aleppo that one 
might be forgiven for mistaking to be a 
World War II leveling of cities. 
 
Domestic law? Let’s not forget that a very 
recent poll (before the bombings in New 
York) found that only 32% of Americans 
thought that the government’s anti-
terrorism policies “have gone too far in 
restricting the average person’s civil 
liberties” while a whopping 53% believe 
“they have not gone far enough to 
adequately protect the country.” As 
terrorist incidents persist, any attempt to 
adjust the domestic legal framework may 
end with something much at odds with 
what Rosa and the human rights-centered 
community would seem to want. 
 
Frankly, it also isn’t clear to me that 
creating in essence a third legal regime, 
either international or domestically, will 
result in the clarity and simplicity Rosa 
desires, at least not if it’s supposed to be a 
genuinely new kind of law and not simply 
a return, especially in international law, 
to the ways states have actually 
understood things and acted and regarded 
as lawful under existing paradigms of law.  
The problem with the binary legal view — 
including thinking that it creates 
problems that require solving through a 
genuinely new legal paradigm — is that 
the law was never cleanly binary in the 
first place.   
 
And more law doesn’t necessary produce 
better solutions. “Grey area” cases will 
continue to arise, and their resolution will 
always be fact-specific. Is it hard to divine 
the applicable law and to apply it 
appropriately in many (most?) 
circumstances? Of course, but that’s what 
lawyers do. And let’s keep in mind that in 
a high-technology era, there are many 
extraordinarily complicated security 
tasks, so lawyers shouldn’t feel themselves 
entitled to exemption from the problems of 
complexity and blurred lines. 
 
Taken as a whole, it’s pretty clear that 
Rosa wants to start a much-needed 
dialogue with How Everything Became 
War and not necessarily to definitively 
resolve each concern raised. Indeed, a 
central purpose of the book seems to be to 
alert the reader to the very fact that the 
issues exist and provide some context to 
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think about them. I could easily envision 
this book being a platform for a graduate 
or law school seminar where students 
were assigned to critique (or confirm) the 
matters she raises. 
 
How Everything Became War could hardly 
be richer in raising critically important 
issues; it’s a must-read conversation-
starter par excellence. What makes it 
especially engaging is Rosa’s constructive 
tenor and tone. It isn’t dictatorial or 
condescending as so many of the books of 
this genre tend to be.  Rather, when you 
come to the end, it’s almost as if she turns 
to you — sitting side by side in your 
airplane seats — and says, “Ok, that’s 
what I think; what do you think?  I’m 
listening.”  And, really, isn’t that what the 
best airplane seat partners — er, books — 
do? 
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